Previous research has established that the predictions of game theory are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by characterizing conditions on the primitives of the model-the players' beliefs and higher-order beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters-for the behavior of a given Harsanyi type to be approximated by the behavior of (a sequence of) perturbed types. This amounts to providing belief-based characterizations of the strategic topologies of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) . We apply our characterizations to a variety of questions concerning robustness to perturbations of higher-order beliefs, including genericity of types that are consistent with a common prior, and we investigate the connections between our notions of robustness and the notion of common p-belief of Monderer and Samet (1989) .
Introduction
A major concern with non-cooperative game theory is its reliance on details. The formal description of a strategic situation as a game requires informational assumptions that are often not verifiable in full detail by the analyst in real life, such as the players' beliefs about the precise order of moves, the actions available to the players when they move, and their exact payoff functions. Unfortunately, game theoretic solutions are known to depend sensitively on those assumptions. For example, in an exchange economy with uncertainty, where agents share a common prior on the underlying state of the world, there is no feasible trade that is commonly known to be mutually acceptable (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) , whereas such a trade can exist if the common prior and common knowledge assumptions are slightly violated (Morris, 1994) . In auction environments, bidders with independent values retain information rents (Myerson, 1981) , while the auctioneer can fully extract their surplus when their values are slightly correlated (Crémer and McLean, 1988) . 1 In the alternating-offers bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982) , players reach an immediate agreement in the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium, but delay to agreement is possible in equilibrium when the players have heterogeneous beliefs about who will make an offer in each period (Yildiz, 2003) . In all these disparate and prominent economic scenarios, a model that makes unwarranted informational assumptions may deliver predictions that are not robust.
What form of misspecification error can be allowed in a model of the players' beliefs, to ensure the model will deliver robust predictions across a wide range of economic situations? Focusing on strategic-form games with incomplete information, we take the point of view of the analyst who posits a type space (Harsanyi, 1967-68) to model the players' uncertainty, and recognizes that his model may be misspecified. For example, he may assume that there is common knowledge of the true payoff-relevant parameter, but understands that such common knowledge assumption can be at best an approximation of reality. Or, as is often the case in practice, he may posit a finite type space, or a type space with a common prior, but realizes that the true type space may be larger, or that the true common prior distribution may be slightly different from the one assumed, or even that the players may have slightly different priors. To analyze the impact of such kinds of misspecifications, we study the tail properties of the hierarchies of beliefs encoded in the Harsanyi types-a player's beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters, his beliefs about the other players' beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters, and so on, ad infinitum-and their implications for behavior. Our main finding is an exact characterization of what it takes for a pair of types to display similar strategic behaviors. Thus, we measure the minimum level of precision of the analyst's information model that is required for accurate predictions of strategic play.
To explain our results we first need to be precise about what we mean by "strategic behavior." Our behavioral assumption is that players play a Bayesian equilibrium on a type space (possibly without a common prior). Thus, from the perspective of the analyst, who does not know the true type space of the players and has a concern for robustness, the relevant solution concept is (interim correlated) rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2006) . Indeed, the set of actions that are rationalizable for a type t coincides with the set of actions that can be played in some Bayesian equilibrium on some type space, by some type that has the same hierarchy of beliefs as t (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2007, Remark 2) . A similar perspective is taken by Bergemann and Morris (2009) in the context of robust mechanism design. See also Aumann (1987) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) for early papers pioneering this approach.
Formally, our main results are characterizations of the strategic topology and the uniform strategic topology of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) . The former is the coarsest topology on the universal type space (Mertens and Zamir, 1985) -the space of all hierarchies of beliefsunder which the correspondence that maps each type of a player into his set of rationalizable actions displays the same kind of continuity properties that the best-reply, Nash equilibrium and rationalizability correspondences exhibit in complete information games. 2 Thus, for any player, a sequence of types t n converges in the strategic topology to a type t if and only if, for every finite game and every action a of the player in the game, the following conditions are equivalent: (a) action a is rationalizable for type t; (b) for every " > 0 and sufficiently large n, action a is "-rationalizable for type t n , where " is a size of sub-optimization allowed in the incentive constraints. Convergence in the uniform strategic topology adds the requirement that the rate of convergence in (b) be uniform across all finite games (with uniformly bounded payoffs).
As shown by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) , a sequence of types converges in the strategic topology only if it converges in the product topology: for every integer k > 1, the sequence of k-order beliefs must converge weakly. However, the Electronic Mail game of Rubinstein (1989) and, more generally, the structure theorem of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) , show that convergence in the product topology does not imply strategic convergence. Our characterizations are based on a strengthening of product convergence that requires k-order beliefs to converge at a rate that is uniform in k.
We first explain the characterization of the uniform strategic topology, as it is simpler to state and can serve as a benchmark for the other characterization result. For each k, endow the space of k-order beliefs with the Prohorov distance, which is a standard distance that metrizes the topology of weak convergence of probability measures (Billingsley, 1999) . Say that a sequence of types t n converges uniform-weakly to a type t if the k-order belief of t n converges to the k-order belief of t and the rate of convergence is uniform in k. Our first main result, Theorem 1, states that uniform strategic convergence is equivalent to uniform weak convergence. 3 To interpret, consider an analyst who would like to make predictions with some minimal level of accuracy, and wants to achieve this level of accuracy uniformly across all strategic situations that the players might face. 4 A tight condition for such uniformly robust prediction is that the analyst's model of the players' beliefs and higher-order beliefs be sufficiently precise, with the required degree of precision, as measured by the Prohorov distance, binding uniformly over all levels of the belief hierarchy.
The content of Theorem 1 can be dissected in two parts. First, the theorem underscores the role of uniform convergence of hierarchies of beliefs as a requirement for robustness. In light of the structure theorem of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) , which shows that the tails of the hierarchies of beliefs can have a large impact on strategic behavior, the role of uniform convergence should not come as a surprise. Second, the theorem quantifies the impact of a misspecification at each order of the hierarchy by the Prohorov distance. We view this as a nontrivial part of the theorem. Indeed, the Prohorov distance, on which the notion of uniform weak convergence is based, is but one of many equivalent distances that metrize the topology of weak convergence of probability measures. For any such distance, one can consider the associated uniform distance over infinite hierarchies of beliefs. It turns out that these distances may generate different topologies over infinite hierarchies, even though the induced topologies over k-order beliefs coincide for each finite k. 5 Theorem 1 identifies one of these uniform distances that ultimately characterizes the uniform-strategic topology.
The characterization of the strategic topology (Theorem 2) is also based on uniform convergence and the Prohorov metric, but is more subtle. The relevant class of events for uniform weak convergence, and a fortiori, uniform strategic convergence, is the entire Borel -algebra of the universal type space. By contrast, our characterization of the strategic topology highlights the role of coarser information structures called frames. A frame is a profile of finite partitions of the universal type space-one partition for each player-that satisfies a measurability condition: each player's belief concerning the events in the frame must pin down a unique atom of that player's partition. (We discuss the meaning of this condition below.) For any frame P and any positive integer k, we define a distance over types, d k P , that is analogous to the Prohorov distance over korder beliefs, but restricts the events for which the proximity is measured to those in the frame P . Say that a sequence of types t n converges to a type t uniform-weakly on P if, for every positive integer k, t n converges to t under d k P and the rate of convergence is uniform in k. Our second main result, Theorem 2, states that a sequence of types converges strategically if and only if it converges uniform-weakly on every frame.
A frame can be interpreted as a coarsening of the canonical information structure of the universal type space where each player is assumed to know only his belief about the payoff-relevant 4 This may be the case if the analyst is a mechanism designer who will ultimately determine the game that the players will face by his choice of a mechanism.
5 In Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010) we report an example of a sequence of types that converges uniform weakly but fails to converge in the uniform topology associated with a distance (different from Prohorov) that metrizes the topology of weak convergence of probability measures.
states and the events in the other players' partitions (the events the player "can reason about"). The measurability condition is a natural epistemic condition for a model of coarse information in a multi-agent setting: it amounts to the requirement that every event concerning player j that player i can reason about is either known to be true or known to be false by player j . Since the strategic behavior of a player in a game can only be affected by events that the player knows, it is intuitive that strategic convergence should imply uniform-weak convergence only on frames and not on all information structures.
To shed further light on the impact of higher-order beliefs, we use our characterization to investigate the connection between strategic convergence and a natural notion of uniform convergence based on common p-beliefs (Monderer and Samet, 1989) . 6 Say that a sequence of types t n converges in common beliefs to a type t if t n converges to t in the product topology and, for every event E and every p > 0, the following conditions are equivalent: (i) E is common p-belief for type t ; (ii) for every " > 0, k > 1 and sufficiently large n, type t n has common .p "/-belief on the event that the players have k-order beliefs that are "-close to those from E. This is the interim analogue of the ex ante notion of convergence based on common p-beliefs, which the seminal papers of Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) have shown to characterize the ex ante strategic topology for Bayesian equilibrium on countable common prior type spaces.
We establish, using the characterization of Theorem 2, that strategic convergence implies convergence in common beliefs (Theorem 3). But, somewhat surprisingly, we find that the converse fails: we exhibit a sequence of types that converges in common beliefs but does not converge uniform-weakly on a frame (Example 5). These results highlight a fundamental difference between the common prior, equilibrium, ex ante framework of the early literature and our noncommon prior, non-equilibrium, interim framework. Nonetheless, when the limit is assumed a finite type-a type that belongs to a finite type space-we show that convergence in common beliefs is equivalent to uniform weak convergence, and hence, a fortiori, to both uniform strategic and strategic convergence (Theorem 4).
Finally, we use our characterizations to revisit, and reverse, two important genericity results concerning the structure of the universal type space. The first result, due to Ely and Pęski (2011) , shows that critical types-those types which display discontinuous rationalizable behavior-form a meager set under the product topology. By way of contrast, we show that they form an open and dense set under the strategic topology (Theorem 5). Second, Lipman (2003) shows that types consistent with a common prior are dense in the universal type space under the product topology. Instead, we show that those types are nowhere dense under the strategic topology (Theorem 6). We also report measure-theoretic versions of these genericity results based on the notions of prevalence and shyness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the incomplete information 6 An event E is common p-belief for a given type if that type assigns probability at least p to E, assigns probability at least p to the event that E obtains and the other players assign probability at least p to E, and so forth, ad infinitum. model and reviews the basic definitions and properties of type spaces, hierarchies of beliefs, common p-beliefs and the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability. Section 3 presents the strategic topologies of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) and their characterizations in terms of beliefs, and studies their relationship with the notion of common p-belief of Monderer and Samet (1989) . Section 4 examines the genericity of critical types and common prior types under the strategic topology and also their measure-theoretic genericity. All proofs are presented in the appendix.
The strategic topology is the topology of strategic convergence on T i . 15;16 The implication from (b) to (a)-for every game G and action a i of player i in G-is a form of upper hemi-convergence of the rationalizable correspondence, and is equivalent to convergence in the product topology (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2006 , Theorems 1 and 2). In turn, the implication from (a) to (b) is a form of lower hemi-convergence, which, instead, does not follow from convergence in the product topology, as the well known example of Rubinstein (1989) demonstrates. Finally, if the implication from (a) to (b) holds for every game G and action a i of player i in G, then the implication from (b) to (a) also holds (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2006 , Corollary 1).
If we strengthen Definition 1 to require the rate of convergence N to be independent of the game G (in all games with uniformly bounded payoffs), we then obtain the following definition.
Definition 2 (Uniform strategic topology). A sequence of types t n i converges uniform-strategically to a type t i if for every payoff bound M > 0 there exist positive integers .N " / ">0 such that for every game G with jGj 6 M and every action a i of player i in G, the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) a i is rationalizable for t i in G; (b) for every " > 0 and n > N " , a i is "-rationalizable for t n i in G. The uniform strategic topology is the topology of uniform strategic convergence on T i .
We proceed with the characterizations of the strategic and the uniform-strategic topologies in terms of beliefs. We begin with the uniform-strategic topology, as its characterization takes a simpler form.
Characterization of the Uniform Strategic Topology
To characterize the uniform strategic topology, we use a notion of convergence of types under which the rate of convergence is uniform across the levels of the belief hierarchy. In order to 15 That is, by definition, a set F ✓ T i is closed under the strategic topology if it contains the limit points of all strategically convergent sequences in F . Alternatively, the strategic topology can be defined as the topology generated by the collection of sets having either the form ft
<" R i .t i ; G; " 0 /g and can be shown to be metrizable. 16 The definition of strategic convergence above follows Ely and Pęski (2011) . The original definition of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) is different, but both definitions are equivalent. Under the original definition, a sequence t n i ! t i strategically if, for every game G, every action a i in G and every > 0, the following are equivalent: (i)
The 2007 working paper version of Ely and Pęski (2011) proves the equivalence between the two definitions. define this uniformity, we first need to fix a distance on the space of k-order beliefs. We use the Prohorov distance, which metrizes the topology of weak convergence of probability measures.
For each integer k > 1, we define recursively a distance d k i on T i as the Prohorov distance over k-order beliefs assuming that the space of .k 1/-order beliefs of player i is endowed with the distance d k 1 i . Thus, for each player i, we set d 0 i ⌘ 0 and, for each integer k > 0 and types s i and t i ,
where
We then consider the following notion of uniform convergence, introduced in Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010) .
Definition 3 (Uniform weak convergence). A sequence of types t n i converges uniform-weakly to a type
Thus, uniform weak convergence is the uniform counterpart of product convergence when the topology of weak convergence of k-order beliefs is metrized by the Prohorov distance. In Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010) , we showed that uniform-weak convergence implies uniformstrategic convergence. Here we prove the reverse implication, thus establishing the equivalence: Theorem 1. A sequence of types converges uniform-strategically if and only if it converges uniformweakly.
The proof of this and all other results is presented in Appendix A.
Ever since Rubinstein's (1989) seminal paper, misspecifications of higher-order beliefs have been recognized to have a potentially large impact on strategic predictions. The systematic treatment of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) exposed the pervasiveness of this sensitivity by showing that the phenomenon is not peculiar to the Electronic Mail game, and hence advocated wider scrutiny of the assumptions one makes about the players' subjective beliefs. Theorem 1 quantifies the exact impact of such assumptions (uniformly over games) by identifying the appropriate measure of proximity of hierarchies of beliefs. In effect, the role of the Prohorov distance in the definition of uniform weak convergence, and hence in our characterization result, turns out to be nontrivial. For any distance that metrizes the topology of weak convergence of probability measures, one can define an associated uniform distance over infinite hierarchies of beliefs. However, these distances may generate different topologies over infinite hierarchies, even though the induced topologies over k-order beliefs coincide for each finite k, as shown in an example in Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010, Section 5.2) . Theorem 1 identifies one of these uniform distances that ultimately characterizes the uniform-strategic topology.
Theorem 1 serves as a benchmark for our characterization of the strategic topology in the next section, which is also based on uniform convergence across the orders of the hierarchy of beliefs. Uniform weak convergence requires proximity of beliefs concerning all events in the universal type space. As will soon become apparent, relaxing this requirement is the key to our characterization of the strategic topology.
Characterization of the Strategic Topology
We begin with a definition that plays a central role in our characterization.
Definition 4 (Frames
To interpret this definition epistemically, note that any profile of partitions induces a coarsening of the canonical information structure of the universal type space, as follows. Given a profile of partitions P D .P i / i 2I (not necessarily a frame), say that a type
Thus, player i knows his beliefs about ‚ ⇥ P i (positive introspection), and knows nothing beyond the implications of that knowledge (hence the coarseness of the model). 19 It is then readily verified that P is a frame if and only if the coarse information model thus defined is "epistemically closed": every event concerning player i that player i can reason about is either known to be true or known to be false by player i . 20 The violation of this condition entails a pathological epistemic model: there is some player i who can reason about some event E contained in T i that cannot be interpreted as an event concerning player i , because player i cannot possibly know whether event E obtains.
The notion of frame is key to our characterization, so it will be useful to go over a few examples to illustrate the definition. We begin by describing a general procedure for constructing a new frame from a given frame. We will then make use of the procedure to discuss three canonical examples of frames.
18 Following standard notation, P i .t i / designates the atom of P i containing t i . 19 In other words, this is the coarsest knowledge structure that is consistent with positive introspection when each player i is able to reason only about events in 2 ‚˝P i . 20 That is, either player i knows the event, or he knows its complement.
Given a frame P and a finite measurable partition … i of the finite-dimensional simplex Å.‚⇥ P i /, define the partition on T i induced by … i , written T i =… i , as follows: any two types of player i belong to the same element of T i =… i if and only if their beliefs over ‚ ⇥ P i belong to the same element of … i . The following lemma is straightforward from the definitions: Lemma 2. Each T i =… i is a measurable partition of T i , and the join .
We now present the examples.
Example 1 (Finite-order frames). A finite-order frame is a frame whose atoms are k-order measurable events, for some integer k > 1. For instance, any profile of first-order measurable partitions is a (first-order) frame, as it can be readily verified from Definition 4. Examples of higher order frames can be constructed by successive application of Lemma 2 beginning with an arbitrary profile of first-order measurable partitions. For instance, given a ✓ 0 2 ‚ consider the following profile of first-order measurable bi-partitions:
where Q is the set of rational numbers. Then, consider the bi-partition
o and its complement. Thus, the join P 1 _ .T 1 =… 1 / partitions T 1 into four second-order measurable events, according to whether or not a type t 1 satisfies each of the following two conditions:
The profile .
, is a frame. Indeed, if any two types of player i agree on the probabilities over ‚ ⇥ P i , then they must agree on the probability of the event E ⇥ C p i .E/. Then, either both types assign probability at least p i to E ⇥ C p i .E/, in which case both types belong to C p i .E/ (by Lemma 1), or both types assign probability less than p i to E ⇥ C p i .E/, in which case both types belong to the complement of C p i .E/ (again, by Lemma 1). More generally, given any frame P and any event E ✓ that is P -measurable, 22 the join between P i and C
Recall that the join of a pair of partitions, denoted by the symbol _, is the coarsest partition that is finer than both partitions in the pair. 22 This means that E is measurable with respect to the algebra 2 ‚˝P 1˝P2 on .
Example 3 (Strategic frames). Given " > 0 and a game G D .A i ; g i /By construction, we have marg
"/, and the opposite inclusion can be proved by interchanging the roles of s i and t i in the argument above. This proves that the "-strategic frame is indeed a frame. ⌥
We emphasize that not every frame is the strategic frame of a game. For instance, in a strategic frame, each player's partition must contain an atom that is open in the product topology, namely, any atom consisting of types whose set of rationalizable actions is minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion). 23 General frames, however, need not contain open sets. The first-order frame in Example 1 illustrates this fact.
Turning to the characterization of strategic convergence, we introduce a notion of uniform weak convergence of types relative to a fixed frame P . For each player i , set d 0 i;P ⌘ 0 and, for each integer k > 0 and types s i and t i , define
Thus, the definition of d k i;P is similar to that of d k i , but restricts the events for which the proximity is measured to those in the frame P . 24 Definition 5 (Uniform weak convergence on frames). A sequence of types t n i converges to a type t i uniform-weakly on a frame P if
With this definition in place, we are ready to state our characterization.
Theorem 2. A sequence of types converges strategically if and only if it converges uniform-weakly on every frame.
The theorem has conceptual and practical significance. First, the result deepens our understanding of the belief underpinnings of strategic robustness by characterizing, in terms of the primitives of the model (hierarchies of beliefs), the class of all perturbations to which the predictions of rationalizability are robust.
Second, as in Theorem 1, the result draws attention to a particular form of uniform convergence across the levels of the belief hierarchy as a condition for robustness. While it is expected that some form of uniform convergence should play a role, it is much less clear at the outset what kind of uniformity would ultimately lead to a characterization. For instance, one might expect that the strategically relevant notion of uniform convergence were the one that requires every event that is common belief for the limit type to remain arbitrarly close to an event that is approximately common belief for the types that are sufficiently far in the tail of the sequence. Indeed, an ex ante variation of this condition characterizes the robust perturbations for Bayesian equilibrium in countable common prior type spaces, as shown in the early papers of Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) . However, this is not the case in our framework, for that notion of convergence turns out to be equivalent to uniform weak convergence on common belief frames 24 This restriction makes d k i;P only a pre-distance, that is, it satisfies d k i;P .s i ; t i / > 0 and d k i;P .t i ; t i / D 0, but it fails symmetry and the triangle inequality.
(c.f. Example 2), whereas the characterization above requires convergence on all frames, and the latter turns out to be a stronger condition.
Third, the theorem highlights the role of frames as the coarse information structures that are relevant for strategic convergence. The role of frames in the "only if" direction is intuitive. Given a profile of partitions that is not a frame, there is always a player i who can reason about some event E that concerns player i such that player i cannot know whether or not E obtains. 25 But since the strategic behavior of a player can only depend on events that the player knows, it is intuitive that failure of uniform weak convergence on a profile of partitions that is not a frame need not imply failure of strategic convergence. As for the "if" direction, the role of frames is more mechanical. If a sequence t n i converges uniform weakly on all frames, then, given an arbitrary game, the sequence must converge uniform-weakly on the strategic frame generated by that game. This fact, combined with the continuity of the "-best-reply correspondence in the Prohorov metric, leads naturally to an induction argument (over the levels of the hierarchy) that proves the strategic convergence of t i , as in the proof presented in Appendix A.3. Fourth, the theorem leads to a connection between the strategic topology and the early literature on robustness mentioned above, and in particular to the notion of common p-beliefs, which plays a prominent role in that literature. In the next section, we use Theorem 2 to show that strategic convergence implies an interim analogue of the mode of convergence based on common p-beliefs of the early literature. We also present a striking example that shows that the converse fails.
Fifth, the characterization enables the genericity analysis that we carry out in Section 4, where we revisit, and reverse, two important genericity results of the recent literature (due to Ely and Pęski (2011) and Lipman (2003) ), which were carried out in the product topology.
Finally, there are instances when the characterization has practical significance. To illustrate, we present Example 4 below, where we describe a case in which it is particularly simple to apply the characterization to prove that a sequence converges strategically, even though the sequence does not converge uniform weakly. Nonetheless, we do not maintain that this is a general feature of the characterization, that is, we do not claim that our characterization has any computational advantages over the definition of strategic convergence in general. In terms of computational complexity, checking uniform weak convergence in every frame appears to be as hard as checking convergence of rationalizable behavior in every game. The main point of our exercise remains to express conditions for robustness in terms of primitives.
Example 4 (A sequence that converges uniform-weakly on all frames). To build our example, we need a preliminary definition. ; : : :/ assigns probability one to state ✓ x i1 , probability one to i assigning probability one to ✓ x i2 , probability one to i assigning probability one to i assigning probability one to ✓ x i3 , and so on. We now present an example of a sequence of Dirac types, s n i , for which it will be particularly simple to prove uniform weak convergence on all frames, even though s n i will not converge uniform weakly. For each positive integer n, let b n be the finite sequence of length 2n comprising n zeroes followed by n ones. Thus, b 1 D .0; 1/, b 2 D .0; 0; 1; 1/, and so on. Let t n i and s n i be the Dirac types of player i such that t n i D .b n ; b nC1 ; : : :/ and s n i D .b 1 ; : : : ; b n 1 ; 0; 0; 0; : : :/. It can be readily verified that d k i .s n i ; t 1 i / equals zero for k 6 n 2 and equals one for k > n 2 . Therefore, the sequence s n i converges to t 1 i in the product topology, but not uniform-weakly. Let us show that s n i converges to t 1 i uniform weakly on every frame. First, note that`
i .s 1 i / D .0; 0; 0; : : :/ share the same first n 1 coordinates (a sequence of n 1 zeroes), hence d n 1 i .`
i / in the product topology. Next, fix an arbitrary frame P . Let P 0 i ✓ P i be the set of all elements of P i that contain infinitely many types from the sequence` i .t n i /. Thus, for every n and P i 2 P 0 i , there is a type in P i whose first n 1 coordinates are all zeroes. It follows that, for every k and P i 2 P 0 i , we have` .s n i ; t 1 i / D 0 for every k > 1 and n > N . Thus, for all n > N , we have sup k>1 d k i;P .s n i ; t 1 i / D 0, and hence the sequence s n i converges to t 1 i uniform-weakly on P . As this is true for every frame P , we conclude that s n i converges strategically to t 1 i , as claimed. ⌥
Convergence in Common Beliefs
Previous work on strategic topologies for Bayesian equilibrium (BE) under common priors (Monderer and Samet, 1996; Kajii and Morris, 1998) has proved equivalences between an ex ante notion of strategic convergence for BE and ex ante notions of convergence based on common beliefs. In this section, we consider the interim version of common belief convergence, prove that it is a necessary condition for convergence in the strategic topology for interim correlated rationalizability, and demonstrate, by means of an example, that it fails to be sufficient. This highlights a fundamental difference between the strategic topologies in the common prior, equilibrium, ex ante framework of Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) and in our non-common prior, non-equilibrium, interim framework.
Definition 6 (Common belief convergence). A sequence of types t n i converges in common beliefs to a type t i if for every ı > 0, every integer k > 1, every measurable set E ✓ and every p 2 OE0; 1ç 2 with t i 2 C p i .E/, there exists N such that for every n > N , t n i 2 C
To shed light on the definition, an analogy with product convergence is useful. A necessary and sufficient condition for a sequence of types t n i to converge to a type t i in the product topology is that for every ı > 0, every integer k > 1, every measurable set E ✓ and every p 2 OE0; 1ç 2 with t i 2 B p i .E/, there exists N such that for every n > N , t n i 2 B p ı1 i
.E ı;k /. 27 There is thus a formal sense in which convergence in common beliefs is the "common" analogue of product convergence.
Notice that common belief convergence implies product convergence, because setting p D
As for the connection with strategic convergence, we show: Theorem 3. Strategic convergence implies convergence in common beliefs.
This result is useful for three reasons. First, it improves our understand of the strategic topology by providing an easy-to-interpret "lower bound" on how strong strategic convergence is. Second, the result (coupled with the example below), clarifies the relationship between the strategic topology for interim rationalizability on the universal type space and the ex ante strategic topology for BE in common prior, countable type spaces of the early literature on robustness. Third, the result is used in our proofs of the topological genericity results of Section 4).
As mentioned, the converse of Theorem 3 fails to hold:
Example 5 (Convergence in common beliefs does not imply strategic convergence). We shall exhibit a sequence of types t n 1 that converges in common beliefs to a type t 1 , but does not converge uniform-weakly on a frame; hence, by Theorem 2, it does not converge strategically either. To construct the sequence, fix ✓ 0 2 ‚ and 0 < p < q < 1. For each player i , pick a type r i that satisfies the following two conditions: (i) r i assigns probability zero to state ✓ 0 ;
26 If we modify the definition to require the equivalence between (a) and (b) to hold only for events E that are closed in the product topology, then the notion of convergence remains the same. Indeed, letting E denote the product-topology closure of E, we have
This follows directly from the following two facts: (i) the Mertens-Zamir isomorphism i W T i ! Å.‚ ⇥ T i / becomes a homeomorphism when each T j is endowed with the product topology and Å.‚ ⇥ T i / is endowed with the topology of weak convergence (as remarked in footnote 14); (ii) the Prohorov metric on Å.‚ ⇥ T i / metrizes the topology of weak convergence.
(ii) for every product-closed proper subset E ⇢ and ⌘ > 0, r i … C
⌘1
i .E/. 28 Let s i and t i be the types who assign probability one to ✓ 0 and whose beliefs about the other player's types are as specified in Figure 1 below. Since r 1 and r 2 satisfy property (ii) above, for every p 2 .0; 1ç 2 , every product-closed proper subset E ✓ , and every i 2 I ,
In particular, no nontrivial event is common .q; p/-belief at t 1 . We exploit this fact to construct the sequence t n 1 so that the probability assigned to .✓ 0 ; t 2 / drops to q Å > p under t n 1 , while ensuring that all events commonly p-believed at t 1 for some p 2 .0; 1ç 2 remain so at t n 1 . Because the probability assigned to .✓ 0 ; t 2 / under t n 1 and t 1 differ by a positive Å, we are able to construct a frame on which t n 1 fails to converge to t 1 uniform-weakly. The construction of the sequence mimics the structure in Figure 1 . Fix 0 < Å 6 q p and for each player i define s n i and t n i as follows: let t 1 1 D r 1 and, for each n > 1, let s n 2 , s n 1 , t n 2 and t nC1 1 be the types who assign probability one to ✓ 0 and whose beliefs about the other player's types are as described in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: The sequences of types s n i and t n i .
The sequence t n 1 converges to t 1 in common beliefs. To see why, first note that t n 1 ! t 1 in the product topology: by the construction in Figures 1 and 2, s 1 2 has the same first-order belief 28 Types that satisfy these conditions exist. Ely and Pęski (2011, Theorem 1) show that the types that satisfy property
(ii) are precisely those types to which product convergence is equivalent to strategic convergence, called regular types.
They show that the set of regular types is a residual subset of the universal type space (in the product topology), in particular a non-empty set. As for condition (i), note that any type of player i that assigns probability one to some .✓; u i /, where u i is a type of player i that satisfies property (ii), must also satisfy property (ii). This implies the existence of types satisfying both (i) and (ii).
as s 2 , hence s 1 1 has the same second-order belief as s 1 , which implies t 1 2 has the same third-order belief as t 2 , and so forth. Second, given an arbitrary ı > 0, by the construction in Figure 2 and the product-convergence t n 1 ! t 1 , for each integer k > 1 we have t n 1 2 B q Å 1
It follows, by (2) and footnote 26, that t n 1 ! t 1 in common beliefs, as claimed. To conclude the example, it remains to show: Claim 1. There is a frame P such that t n 1 6 ! t 1 uniform-weakly on P .
This claim is proved in Appendix A.5. Here, to provide intuition, we give a proof of the weaker but closely related statement that t n 1 does not converge to t 1 uniform-weakly. .t n 1 ; t 1 / > Å for all n, and hence t n 1 6 ! t 1 uniformweakly, as claimed. ⌥ This example, combined with Theorem 3, shows that strategic convergence is strictly stronger than convergence in common beliefs. However, when the limit type is assumed a finite type-a type that belongs to a finite type space-we show that convergence in common beliefs implies uniform-strategic convergence. We thus have:
Theorem 4. Given a finite type t i and a sequence of (possibly infinite) types t n i , the following statements are equivalent:
i uniform-weakly on every frame; (e) t n i ! t i in common beliefs.
Genericity Analysis
We apply our characterizations to establish topological genericity results on the universal type space concerning critical types and common prior types. We also provide analogous results for the measure-theoretic genericity notions of finite shyness and finite prevalence. 29
Genericity of Critical Types
In a recent paper, Ely and Pęski (2011) define critical types as those types to which product convergence fails to imply strategic convergence. That is, a type t i is critical if there is a sequence of types t n i that converges to t i in the product topology such that, for some " > 0 and some game G, R i .t i ; G/ › R i .t n i ; G; "/ infinitely often. Thus, from the point of view of robustness, the critical types are the problematic types.
How "large" is the set of critical types? Ely and Pęski (2011) provide two results that address this question. The first one is their insightful characterization of critical types in terms of common beliefs:
Ely and Pęski (2011, Theorem 1). A type t i is critical if and only if
i .E/ for some p > 0 and some product-closed proper subset
It follows that all finite types are critical, and so are almost all types that belong to a type space where there is a common prior (Ely and Pęski, 2011, Theorems 4 and 5). Thus, the set of critical types is "large" in the sense that critical types are pervasive: virtually all types used in applications are critical types.
An alternative approach to answer the question is based on topological genericity. There is, however, a tension between topological genericity in the product topology and the pervasiveness of critical types. Indeed, Ely and Pęski (2011) show that the set of critical types is topologically small (under the product topology):
Ely and Pęski (2011, Theorem 2). The set of critical types is meager under the product topology on T i (i.e., it is contained in a countable union of nowhere dense sets).
We show, however, that this tension disappears when one considers either genericity under the strategic topology, or genericity under the measure-theoretic notion of finite prevalence:
Theorem 5. The set of critical types is open and dense in the universal type space under the strategic topology. Furthermore, the set of critical types is finitely prevalent.
Finally, consider the following variation of the notion of critical types: a type t i is uniformly critical if there is some sequence that converges to t i in the product topology but fails to converge uniform-strategically. An immediate implication of our Theorem 1 is that all types are uniformly critical, since for every type t i in the universal type space there is always a sequence that converges to t i in the product topology but does not converge uniform-weakly. 30
Genericity of Common Prior Types
The common prior assumption, according to which the players' beliefs are generated by a single probability distribution on the state space, is a cornerstone of virtually all models of information economics. Recall that a common prior on a countable type space .
A common prior type is a type that belongs to a countable type space that has a common prior.
The widespread use of common prior models, in both theoretical and applied work, begs the question of whether the behavioral implications of the common prior assumption are robust to misspecification errors in the assumed type space. Taking an interim perspective, Lipman (2003) shows that (finite) common prior types are dense in the product topology, but warns that this result should not be interpreted as a statement that the common prior assumption is without loss of generality: Although every type can be approximated by a common prior type in the product topology, the strategic behavior of that type can be very different from the strategic behavior of any approximating common prior type.
The next result shows that this lack of robustness is a pervasive phenomenon in the universal type space. The denseness result of Lipman (2003) is reversed, once we consider the strategic topology rather than the product topology. Moreover, an analogous conclusion holds when we look at measure-theoretic genericity.
Theorem 6. The set of common prior types is nowhere dense in the universal type space under the strategic topology. Moreover, it is finitely shy.
A Appendix

A.1 Properties of ICR
Some of the proofs in the appendix use the characterizations of ICR in terms of iterated elimination of never interim best-replies and of iterated elimination of strongly interim dominated strategies. We review these definitions below.
We begin with the recursive characterization of ICR in terms of iterated elimination of never interim best-replies. Given " > 0 and a game G D .A i ; g i / i 2I , for each i 2 I and t i 2 T i , let R 0 i .t i ; G; "/ D A i and, recursively for each k > 1, let R k i .t i ; G; "/ be the set of all a i 2 A i for which there is a measurable function
Then, 
as in the definition of ICR given in Section 2.1. These two kinds of conjetures are related by the disintegration formula:
for every ✓ 2 ‚, a i 2 A i and measurable subset E i ✓ T i . 31
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The if direction is proved in Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010) . The proof of the only if direction relies on Lemma 3, Corollary 1 and Lemma 4 below.
We begin with some useful definitions and notations. Given a game G D . 
The only if part of the theorem is a direct implication of Lemma 4 below. Lemma 3 and Corollary 1 are intermediate results.
Lemma 3. For every " > 0, integer k > 1, player j and finite set of finite types ft j;1 ; t j;2 ; : : : ; t j;N g ⇢ T j , there is a game G D .A i ; g i / i 2I with payoffs in the interval OE 5; 3ç, and a set of actions fa 31 Given a ⌫ that satisfies marg ‚⇥T i ⌫ D i .t i /, the disintegration fomula only pins down i up to a set of i .t i /-probability zero. But, outside this null set, we can set i equal to a measurable selection from the correspondence R k 1 i . ; G; "/, thus ensuring that (3) is satisfied everywhere provided ⌫.‚ ⇥ graph R k 1 i / D 1 (as opposed to almost everywhere). The fact that such a measurable selection exists follows from the upper hemi-continuity of R k 1 i . ; G; "/ (in the product topology) and the Kuratowsky-Nyll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem.
(iv) for every 1 6 n 6 N , a ⇤ j;n 2 R j t j;n ; G ; (v) for every 1 6 n 6 N and s j 2 T j with d k j s j ; t j;n > ", a ⇤ j;n … R j s j ; G; " 2 ; Proof. The proof is by induction on k. Consider first k D 1 and j D 1 (j D 2 can be similarly proved). Fix a finite set of player 1's types t 1;1 ; t 1;2 ; :::; t 1;N . Enumerate the nonempty subsets of ‚ as E 1 , E 2 ,..., E L . For each .n;`/ 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N g ⇥ f0; 1; : : : ; Lg consider the function n;`W ‚ ! OE 1; 1ç described in the following table:
Thus, the functions n;`d efine an auxiliary game between player 1 and Nature, where`D 0 is a safe bet for player 1, and`> 1 is a risky bet on the event ✓ … E`. The rewards of the risky bets are such that:
✏ any type that has the same first-order beliefs as type t 1;n is exactly indifferent between`D 0 and any`> 1; ✏ any type whose first-order belief is different from that of t 1;n strictly prefers some risky bet > 1 than the safe bet`D 0.
We use the functions n;`t o construct a game G D .A i ; g i / i 2I to prove our claim for k D 1. In this game, A 1 D f1; 2; : : : ; N g ⇥ f0; 1; : : : ; Lg P [ a 0 1 ; a c 1 and A 2 D f1; 2; : : : ; N g P [ a 0 2 ; a c 2 : Player 1's payoffs are specified as follows:
1 is a zero action for player 1; ✏ if player 1 chooses a c 1 , she gets 3 if player 2 chooses a c 2 , and gets 0 otherwise (regardless of ✓); ✏ if player 1 chooses .n;`/ 2 f1; : : : ; N g ⇥ f0; : : : ; Lg and the state is ✓, she gets n;`. ✓/ if player 2 chooses n, and she gets n;`. ✓/ 1 if player 2 chooses any action different from n.
Player 2's payoffs are specified as follows:
✏ Player 2 gets 3 if .a c 1 ; a c 2 / is chosen (regardless of ✓), and gets 0 otherwise.
Thus, when the state is ✓ , we can draw the payoff matrix g. ; ; ✓/ as follows: Since n;`. ✓ / 2 OE 1; 1ç for all n,`and ✓, game G has payoffs bounded between 2 and 3. We claim that G, along with the actions a (ii) It remains to prove (iv) and (v). First, .n; 0/ is rationalizable for t 1;n , since given the conjecture that player 2 plays n, type t 1;n gets 0 by playing .n;`/ for any`:
1;n 1 E`jt 1;n D 0; and gets at most 0 by playing any action not in f.n; 0/; : : : ; .n; L/g. Thus, (iv) holds for a ⇤ 1;n D .n; 0/. Second, consider any type s 1 with d 1 1 s 1 ; t 1;n > ". Then, there exists some 1 6`6 L such that 1 E`jt 1;n > 1 E ";0
Then, given any conjecture about the behavior of player 2, the difference in expected payoffs between .n;`/ and .n; 0/ for type s 1 is
1 .E`jt 1;n / 1 .E`js 1 / > ": Hence, a ⇤ 1;n D .n; 0/ is not "-rationalizable for type s 1 , which proves (v). We now prove our claim for k C 1 assuming that it holds for k. Again, we assume j D 1, and the proof for j D 2 is similar. Let t 1;1 ; : : : ; t 1;N be arbitrary finite types of player 1. Consider the finite set T 2 D t 2;1 ; t 2;2 ; : : : ; t 2;N 0 of all types of player 2 that are assigned positive probability by some t 1;n , for n D 1; : : : ; N . By the induction hypothesis, we can find a game 
32 The equality follows because d 0 ⌘ 0 and ‚ is endowed with the discrete metric.
For each .n;`/ 2 f1; : : : ; N g ⇥ f0; : : : ; Lg, define a function 
✏ If player 2 chooses .a 2 ; m/, he gets g 2 .a 2 ; a 1 ; ✓/ if player 1 chooses a 1 2 A 1 , and he gets g 2 a 2 ; a c 1 ; ✓ otherwise. 33 Recall that we identify any measurable subset E ✓ T k 2 with the cylinder ft 2 2 T 2 W the k-order belief of t 2 belongs to Eg:
By the induction hypothesis, game G satisfies property (ii) and has payoffs in the interval OE 5; 3ç; it follows that game N G also has payoffs in the interval OE 5; 3ç. We now prove that game N G, along with the actions a 
We now prove that Claim 2 implies properties (iii)-(v).
(iii): By the induction hypothesis, R 2 . ; G; / D R k 2 . ; G; /. Thus, Claim 2 implies that
; N G; and hence (iii). (iv): Given any 1 6 n 6 N , consider the conjecture
for each n 0 D 1; : : : N 0 and ✓ 2 ‚. By part 1 of Claim 2 and the fact that G satisfies property (iv) (by the induction hypothesis), 2 is a rationalizable conjecture in N G. Moreover, given such a conjecture, t 1;n gets an expected payoff of 0 by playing .n;`/ for anỳ , and gets at most 0 by playing any action in N A 1 n f.n; 0/; : : : ; .n; L/g:
In particular, a ⇤ 1;n D .n; 0/ is a best reply for t 1;n . (v): Fix 1 6 n 6 N and consider any type s 1 with d kC1 1 s 1 ; t 1;n > ". Then, there exists some 1 6`6 L such that
It follows that, given any " 2 -rationalizable conjecture 2 W ‚ ⇥ T 2 ! Å. N A 2 /, the difference in expected payoffs between actions .n;`/ and .n; 0/ for type s 1 is at least "=2. To prove this, we consider two cases separately: when player 2 chooses m D n; and when player 2 chooses m ¤ n.
First, conditional on player 2 choosing n, the expected payoff difference between actions .n;`/ and .n; 0/ for type s 1 , given an arbitrary " 2 -rationalizable conjecture
But, for any .✓; s 2 / 2 ‚ ⇥ T 2 and n 0 D 1; : : : ; N 0 ,
(by the induction hypothesis) and thus, if ⇡ s 1 ; 2 .n/ > 0,
Second, conditional on player 2 choosing m ¤ n, the expected payoff difference between actions .n;`/ and .n; 0/ for type s 1 (given any conjecture) is at least n;`. a c 2 ; ✓ /=2 D 1 .E`jt 1;n /=2 > "=2. (This is because a c 2 ¤ a ⇤ 2;n 0 for all n 0 , and hence .a c 2 ; ✓/ … F`for every ✓.) We have thus shown that, given any "=2-rationalizable conjecture, and conditional on any choice of m D 0; : : : ; N by player 2 with ⇡ s 1 ; 2 .m/ > 0, type s 1 gains at least "=2 by deviating from .n; 0/ to .n;`/. Thus, he also gains "=2 unconditionally on m, and hence property (v) follows.
To conclude the proof, it remains to prove Claim 2. We prove it by induction on r > 0. First, the claim is trivially true for r D 0. We now consider r > 1, assume that the claim holds for any 0 6 r 0 < r, and prove that it also holds for r.
Consider the mapping is part of a coordination pair in G, hence a c 2 is rationalizable in G for any type. Thus, 2 is an .r 1/-order -rationalizable conjecture in G. Moreover, for any a
Then, (5) and (6) imply a 1 2 R r 1 .t 1 ; G; /.
Define N 2 as the conjecture in N G such that N 2 .✓; t 2 / OE.a 2 ; 0/ç def D 2 .✓; t 2 / OEa 2 ç for any .✓; t 2 / 2 ‚ ⇥ T 2 and a 2 2 A 2 (and thus N 2 .✓; t 2 / OE.a 2 ; n/ç D 0 for any n > 0). Since 2 is .r 1/-order -rationalizable in G , 2 .✓; t 2 / OEa 2 ç > 0 implies a 2 2 R r 1 2 .t 2 ; G; /, and by the induction hypothesis, .a 2 ; 0/ 2 R r 1 2 t 2 ; N G; . Hence, N 2 is .r 1/-order -rationalizable in G. We will now show that a 1 is a -best reply to N 2 for t 1 in N G. First, by (7) and the definition of
1 in (7) and recalling that < 1=2, Z 
Consider the map
Let 1 be the conjecture in G such that
, and by the induction hypothesis, N a 1 2 R r 1
1
.t 1 ; G; /. Moreover, a c 1 is part of a coordination pair in G, hence it is rationalizable for any type. Thus, 1 is an .r 1/-order -rationalizable conjecture in G. Moreover, (5) implies that for any a 0 2 2 A 2 ,
R r 2 t 2 ; N G; R r 2 .t 2 ; G; / ⇥ f0; 1; : : : ; N g: Let .a 2 ; m/ 2 R r 2 .t 2 ; G; / ⇥ f0; 1; : : : ; N g. Then, there is an .r 1/-order -rationalizable conjecture 
Immediate implication of Lemma 3, upon rescaling the payoffs by a factor of M=5. ⌅ Lemma 4. For every " > 0 there exists ı > 0 such that for every i 2 I and s
Since finite types are dense in the product topology, there is a finite type t To conclude, consider the game G D .A j ; g j / j 2I , defined as follows: The only if direction of Theorem 1 then follows directly from Lemma 4.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We begin with the following auxiliary result about the structure of ICR. 
Likewise, a i 2 R i .t i ; G; "/ if and only if, for every˛i 2 Å.
Proof. Straightforward implication of the characterization of ICR in terms of iterated dominance (see Appendix A.1). ⌅
The if direction of the theorem is an immediate consequence of the following lemma:
Lemma 6. Fix ı > 0 and a game G D .A i ; g i / i 2I and let P denote the strategic frame associated with G. For every integer k > 0 , i 2 I and s i ; t i 2 T i ,
In particular, for every i 2 I and s
Proof. We need only prove the first result, as the second result is a straightforward implication of the first one. For k D 0 the result is trivially true, as R 0 i ⌘ A i . Proceeding by induction, we assume the result is true for k > 0 and show that it remains true for k C 1. 
where, for each ✓ 2 ‚ and nonempty
By Lemma 5, in order to prove that a i 2 R kC1 i .s i ; G; 4M ı/ we need only show that X ✓2‚;B✓A i
To prove this, first note that the induction hypothesis implies
Second, enumerate the elements of the finite set Then,
where (18) 
The proof of the only if direction of Theorem 2 relies on Lemmas 7 and 8 and Corollary 2 below.
Lemma 7. Fix a frame P . For each ⇣ > 0 there exist " > 0 and a game G D .
"-dense (relative to the Euclidean norm jj jj) in every element of the partition
Proof. Fix ⇣ > 0 and a frame P . Let 0 < " < ⇣ 2 =.1 C p 3/ 2 . Cover the finite-dimensional simplex Å.‚ ⇥ P i / by a finite union of open balls B 1 ; : : : ; B N of diameter p ". Select one point from B n \ ' 1 i .E/, for each n D 1; : : : ; N and E 2 P i , and let A i denote the set of selected points. By construction, A i satisfies (i). Consider the quadratic score
which can be readily shown to satisfy
Then, define
which clearly satisfies (ii).
.by jja
G; "/, and this proves (iii). Turning to (iv), let (a) for every i 2 I and t i 2 T i ,
Proof. To prove (a), we will show that the pair of correspondences
; which is nonempty-valued by (i) of Lemma 7, has the "-best-reply property. Indeed, given any
and hence, jja i ⇡ P Turning to (b), since d 0 i;P ⌘ 0 the result is true for k D 0 (vacuously). Proceeding by induction, assume the result is true for k > 0 and let us show that it remains true for k C 1. Fix i 2 I and s i , t i 2 T i with d kC1 i;P .s i ; t i / > ı. Then, there is some ✓ 2 ‚ and some E 2 P i such that
Consider an arbitrary k-order 2"-rationalizable It follows that for every .✓; s i / 2 ‚ ⇥ T i , 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
We need the following piece of notation. Given an integer m > 1, a measurable subset E ✓ and p 2 OE0; 1ç 2 , define the event that E is m-order p-belief recursively as follows: Lemma 9. For every integer k > 1 and ı > 0 there exists a k-order frame P such that, for every i 2 I , every atom of P i has d k i -diameter at most ı. Proof. For k D 1 the result is trivial, as any profile of first-order measurable partitions is a frame. Proceeding by induction, consider k > 1, fix ı > 0 and let P be a k-order measurable frame whose atoms all have d k i -diameter less than ı=2. Let … i be a finite partition of the simplex Å.‚ ⇥ P i / (viewed as a subset of the Euclidean space R #‚ #P i ) into finitely many Borel measurable subsets with Euclidean diameter less than ı= p #‚#P i . By Lemma 2, the join .
is a .k C 1/-order frame. We claim that every atom of
Lemma 10. Fix ı > 0, an integer k > 1 and a k-order frame P whose atoms all have d k idiameter less than ı for every i 2 I . Then, for every m D 0; : : : ; k, Proof. Fix ı > 0, an integer k > 1 and a k-order frame P whose atoms all have d k i -diameter less than ı, for every i 2 I . (Such a frame exists by Lemma 9.) For m D 0 the conclusion of the lemma is trivial, as d 0 i D d 0 i;P D 0. Consider 1 6 m 6 k and assume the conclusion of the lemma holds for m 1. .s i ; t i / C mı, as required. ⌅ Lemma 11. Fix ı > 0, p 2 .0; 1ç 2 , an integer k > 1 and an event E ✓ that is measurable with respect to a frame Q P . Let P denote the common belief frame Q P i _ C . / ⌘ T i for every i . Next, suppose the result is true for`> k and let us show that it remains true for`C 1. Pick t i 2 C p i .E/ and s i 2 T i with d`C 1 i;P .s i ; t i / < ı and let us show that
Indeed, 36
where the first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that d k i; Q P 6 dì ;P , the second inequality follows from dì ;P .s i ; t i / < ı, the third inequality follows from d`C 1 i;P .s i ; t i / < ı and the last inequality follows from t i 2 C Proof. Fix " > 0, an integer k > 1, p 2 .0; 1ç 2 and a measurable set E ✓ . Let Q P be a k-order frame whose atoms have d k i -diameter at most ı, for every player i . Fix i 2 I , pick F 2 2 ‚˝P i such that E ✓ F ✓ E ı;k and consider the common belief frame P D Q P j _ C 
